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abstract: Contrary to Durkheim’s idea about suicide during wartime, the Nether-
lands had high suicide rates in 1940 and 1945. To explain these findings, we
propose the social integration theory, according to which, people who expect to
be excluded from society are more likely to commit suicide. We examine this idea
using individual-level data on suicide in the Netherlands during the Second World
War, assuming that Jews expected to be excluded by the occupying German forces,
whereas political delinquents expected punishment after the war. In support of
our theory, we found high suicide rates among Jews at the beginning of the war
and high suicide rates among political delinquents when the Netherlands was
liberated. These findings support the proposed theory and call for refinement of
Durkheim’s ideas.
keywords: Durkheim ✦ Jews ✦ political delinquents ✦ political integration ✦ social
exclusion ✦ suicide ✦ war
Durkheim maintained that during great national wars suicide rates are
lower than in more peaceful times (see Durkheim, 1951). In Suicide,
Durkheim explained this finding with his political integration theory,
stating that stronger political involvement in a country reduces the suicide
rate in that country. Subsequent research in this area, however, has had
mixed results. Some studies have found support for the presumed drop
in wartime suicide rates (Dublin, 1963; Dublin and Bunzel, 1933; Lunden,
1947; O’Malley, 1975; Sainsbury, 1972), while others have not (Halbwachs,
1978; Marshall, 1981; Rojcewicz, 1971; Wasserman, 1989, 1992).
In this article, we examine the relationship between war and suicide in
two ways. First, we review studies on the war–suicide link and suggest
a more general formulation of Durkheim’s political integration theory in
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an attempt to explain the findings that have failed to support it. This
‘social integration theory’ argues that a society consists of different groups
that have different expectations in regard to being included in that society
or excluded from it. Although wars and other political events generally
foster social cohesion, in some countries some groups might fear being
excluded from society during these times. These groups are assumed to
have higher suicide rates than other groups, which could account for the
ambiguous findings on the relationship between war and suicide.
Second, we use the Dutch setting as a test case to examine this social
integration theory. Contrary to what would be expected from Durkheim’s
theory, previous research has found that suicide rates in the Netherlands
peaked during the war years 1940 and 1945 (Kruijt, 1960). In this article,
we try to explain this paradox, on the assumption that some groups
expected to be excluded from social life at the beginning of the Second
World War, and other groups, at the end of it. To examine these ideas, we
used individual-level data on suicides in the Netherlands for the period
1937–48.
Theories and Findings on War and Suicide
Previous Research: Empirical Puzzles
Durkheim’s Suicide and his theory that suicide rates drop in countries
involved in national wars have provided a starting point for studies on
the relationship between war and suicide (Durkheim, 1951). Durkheim
found that during the war of 1866 between Austria and Italy, suicides
decreased by about 14 percent in both countries. He found similar drops
in suicide rates during the French–German war of 1870–1 and the 1864
war between Denmark and Saxony. Durkheim explained this wartime
suicide pattern with his political integration theory, arguing that higher
levels of political integration resulted in a lower suicide rate. Political
events, such as wars, but also elections and revolutions, were assumed to
foster political cohesion, thereby lowering the suicide rate (Wasserman,
1983). This relationship between war and suicide has been a topic of a great
deal of research, with findings both supporting and contradicting it.
In looking at aggregate suicide patterns during the First World War
(1914–18) and Second World War (1939–45), cross-national time-series
studies have found support for Durkheim’s theory. Dublin and Bunzel
(1933) found that during the First World War, suicide rates in each of the
nine belligerent countries under study were lower than in the periods
preceding (1911–14) and following (1926–30) it. Sainsbury (1972) showed
that suicide rates decreased during the Second World War in 21 of the 22
nations examined. Time-series studies within a single country have also
confirmed this wartime drop in suicides. Dublin and Bunzel (1933)
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reported that suicide rates in the US states of Massachusetts and Connecti-
cut were lower during the Civil War (1861–5) than in the prewar period
(1856–60). Lunden (1947) examined suicides in France between 1910 and
1943, and showed that during the First and Second World Wars, suicide
rates were much lower than either before or after the war years. O’Malley
(1975) studied the suicide rates of women who were resident in Australia
during the Second World War. He measured war involvement by the
amount of media coverage of the threat of war and the number of
Australian troop casualties, and found that both indicators were inversely
related to female suicide rates.
However, despite this evidence, Durkheim’s presumed wartime drop
in suicides has been questioned. Three arguments stand out. First, it is
acknowledged that in the First and Second World Wars, suicide rates were
lower in belligerent countries, but at the same time, the suicide rates in
surrounding – neutral – countries also decreased (Halbwachs, 1978). For
example, in non-belligerent Sweden, the average suicide rate during the
First World War was 12.9, which is lower than the prewar figure of 18.1
per 100,000 for 1910–1913 and the postwar rate of 14.5 for 1926–1930
(Dublin and Bunzel, 1933). Likewise, in Switzerland, which also remained
neutral during the First World War, the rates were 24.0 for the prewar
period, 19.9 for the war years and 25.3 for the postwar period. Similar
decreases in wartime suicide rates are found for countries that remained
neutral during the Second World War (Rojcewicz, 1971; Sainsbury, 1972).
Second, several studies suggest that while the suicide rates of countries
at war tend to be lower, in some war years the suicide rates have peaked
and actually exceeded those of the years before and after the war. Kruijt
(1960) showed that the suicide rates in the Netherlands for the years at
the beginning (1940) and the ending (1945) of the Second World War were
the highest for the period from 1936 to 1952. A similar pattern was found
in Belgium, France and Norway (Rojcewicz, 1971). In these countries,
which were occupied by German forces, suicide rates in 1940 and in 1945,
especially, were relatively high.
There is a third criticism of Durkheim’s theory. The main argument is
that Durkheim failed to take into account important macro correlates of
war, most notably economic activity, which is assumed to be related posi-
tively to involvement in war and negatively to the risk of suicide
(Marshall, 1981). In a time-series study of suicide data in the US between
1910 and 1933, Wasserman (1989) found that after taking changes in the
national business cycle into account, suicide rates were indeed not lower
during the First World War. Marshall (1981) examined the suicide rates
of white adults in the US between 1933 and 1976. Although he showed
that there was a decrease in the number of suicides during the Second
World War, he found that this could be explained by the impact of the
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national unemployment level on suicide. In a replication of Marshall’s
study, Lester and Yang (1991) measured war operationally as the size of
the military in relation to the population. They found that in the US
between 1933 and 1986, the unemployment level was a stronger correlate
of national suicide rates than the size of the military forces. Only for those
aged 45–64 was there a decrease in numbers of suicides when there were
higher levels of military participation. In summary, aggregate studies
using data from the US have not confirmed Durkheim’s political integra-
tion theory; rather, they have suggested a protective effect from the higher
economic activity during wartime.
Explaining the Empirical Puzzles: Durkheim’s Theory
Refined
How should these contradictions about the pattern of suicides during
wartime be interpreted? The three empirical puzzles for Durkheim’s
theory can be formulated as follows:
1. Why were the suicide rates in European countries that remained neutral
during the First and Second World Wars lower during the war than
before or after the war?
2. Why did suicide rates in several European countries that were occupied
peak at the beginning and end of the Second World War?
3. Why was, after taking levels of economic activity into account, the
suicide rate in the US not lower during the two world wars?
In order to explain these puzzles, we reformulate Durkheim’s political
integration theory in a more general way in this section. Subsequently, in
the next section, we test implications of our refined theory by looking at
suicide during wartime in the Netherlands.
As a starting point for revising Durkheim’s theory, we consider that
Durkheim proposed his political integration theory for neighbouring
countries that were at war (i.e. Austria and Italy, France and Germany,
Denmark and Saxony). These were great national wars, which created the
kind of nationalism and patriotism that brings society together. However,
the First and Second World Wars were more diverse, including not only
countries that were directly involved in fighting (such as England) but
also countries that were far from the field of battle (such as the US),
countries that remained neutral (such as Switzerland) and countries like
the Netherlands that were occupied. The general ‘social integration
theory’ we propose in this article takes this more complicated scenario
into account. It argues that the more strongly people believe that they will be
excluded from society, the greater their risk of suicide. It refines Durkheim’s
political integration theory in two important ways.
First, Durkheim’s political integration theory has to incorporate
International Sociology Vol. 21 No. 2
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people’s expectations of the future (O’Malley, 1975). Although several
European countries remained neutral during the First and Second World
Wars, the fighting took place in neighbouring countries, so the political
integration in the neutral countries was probably as high as in the
countries at war. Countries are often involved in war involuntarily, and
the label ‘neutrality during the war’ can only be concluded by hindsight,
so the citizens of these neutral countries might have feared becoming
involved in the war as well. Not surprisingly, then, lower suicide rates
have been found not only in belligerent countries, but also in European
countries that remained neutral in the First World War (Dublin and
Bunzel, 1933; Halbwachs, 1978) and the Second World War (Rojcewicz,
1971; Sainsbury, 1972). Thus, by considering people’s expectations of the
future, puzzle (1) is explained.
Consider, in contrast, the situation in the US, which came into the First
World War towards its end (i.e. 1917) and into the Second World War two
years in (i.e. December 1941). There were no civil casualties, and except
for the Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor in 1941, the actual fighting was
thousands of miles away. It is possible to assume, then, that the involve-
ment of the US in both wars was less threatening for US citizens than it
was for citizens in the European countries that remained neutral (Stack,
2000). Hence, it is not too surprising that the involvement of the US did
not have a direct effect on the suicide rate in that country. This argument
explains puzzle (3).
Our second refinement of Durkheim’s political integration theory states
that social integration is more general than political integration. This idea
is partly suggested by Durkheim himself in Suicide (Durkheim, 1951: 209),
where he argues that ‘suicide varies inversely with the degree of integra-
tion of the social groups of which the individual forms a part’. Durkheim
mentions religious, domestic and political groups and shows that integra-
tion in each of these groups confirms the predicted inverse relation with
suicide. However, Durkheim failed to consider situations in which integra-
tion in one group might diminish integration in other groups and, in turn,
lower overall social integration (see also Wasserman, 1989: footnote 1).
This notion has important consequences for our assumptions about the
relationship between war and suicide. Durkheim hypothesized that
higher levels of political integration always lower the risk of suicide.
O’Malley (1975: 348), after adding the idea that people have expectations
of the future, formulated this explicitly: ‘an increase in the perceived
threat to a group, from an external source, will result in an increase in the
integration of the group, and hence a decrease in its suicide rates’.
However, we argue that a perceived threat from an external source
increases the political involvement of a group but it only lowers the risk
of suicide if it is associated with social integration more generally.
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Societies consist of different groups that have different expectations about
being included or excluded from the broader society. Although wars and
other political events generally foster social integration in countries, in
some situations, a war might cause certain groups to fear being excluded
from society, and this fear could result in higher suicide rates among these
groups.
This refinement of Durkheim’s political integration theory can account
for the peaks in suicide rates observed at the beginning of the Second World
War in countries that were occupied, such as Belgium, France and the
Netherlands. In 1940, these countries had sizeable Jewish communities. It
can be assumed that in these countries, many Jews expected to be excluded
from society as the German forces took over. The German Nazi Party was
established in 1920, seized power in 1933 and started war against Poland
in 1939. By 1940, the anti-Semitic ideology of the Nazi Party was known
to a certain extent among the Jews in the occupied countries (de Jong, 1995).
This could have led Jews in these countries to expect to be excluded from
society, which could, in turn, have resulted in an increase in suicides in the
Jewish community at the beginning of the German occupation.
In a similar way, the social integration theory is capable of explaining
the peaks in suicides in the occupied countries at the end of the Second
World War. It is well documented that some people collaborated with the
German invaders during the war. This ranged from membership in pro-
German parties, to assisting German actions, to hunting for Jews in
hiding, to fighting on the side of the German forces. At the end of the
war, when these ‘political delinquents’ lost the protection of the occupy-
ing German forces, they might have feared social exclusion and, conse-
quently, committed suicide. In summary, extending Durkheim’s theory
by considering social exclusion of specific groups explains puzzle (2).
The second refinement provides another look at findings about the
impact of the First and Second World Wars on suicide rates in the US. As
mentioned earlier, during both wars, suicide rates in the US were lower
than either before or after, and previous studies have found that these
dips could be entirely attributed to increased economic activity (Lester
and Yang, 1991; Marshall, 1981; Wasserman, 1989). We have argued that
the social integration theory explains the absence of a direct (political)
effect on suicide from war in the US, assuming that US civilians did not
have strong expectations of becoming involved in the war. The impact of
economic activity on suicide also fits the social integration theory. Unem-
ployment, or economic inactivity in general, is an important aspect of
social exclusion, and the association between employment and suicide
therefore supports the social integration theory. Integrative political and
economic forces therefore need not be regarded as alternative explanations,
for they are both determinants of social inclusion.
International Sociology Vol. 21 No. 2
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Testing Durkheim’s Refined Theory: New Hypotheses
In order to make theoretical progress in general, it is not only necessary
that the new theory explains the empirical contradictions with the older
theory, it is also important to derive and test novel hypotheses from the
new theory. In this article, we use the Dutch setting in the Second World
War as a case study to examine our refinements of Durkheim’s political
integration theory. The Netherlands is a special case of the more general
empirical challenge formulated as puzzle (2): why did suicide rates in
several European countries that were occupied peak at the beginning and
end of the Second World War? The Netherlands was occupied by German
forces from May 1940 to May 1945, and the Dutch paradox for Durkheim’s
proposed wartime decline in suicides was that in the two war years 1940
and 1945, suicide rates peaked (Kruijt, 1960). Can the social integration
theory we propose explain this contradiction? In the following, we
propose a series of hypotheses derived from this theory.
First, consider the 1940 peak in suicides. In 1933, active measures were
initiated against the Jews in Germany, resulting in a migration of about
16,000 German Jews to the Netherlands between 1933 and 1940 (de Jong,
1995). By 1940, Jews in the Netherlands were already aware of Nazi
ideology and practices to a certain extent. When the German forces took
over the Netherlands, there was widespread fear and panic among the
Jews, and hundreds of them escaped to England. The historian de Jong
(1995) mentions the suicides of several famous Jews in May 1940 but
maintains that no one knows how many Jews killed themselves. We
predict that suicides among Jews in the Netherlands peaked in 1940
(Hypothesis 1).
Fear of being excluded from society can also explain the 1945 peak in
suicides. In the Netherlands, a sizeable group had collaborated with the
German invaders. It seems reasonable to assume that towards the end of
the war, members of the pro-German Dutch National Socialist Movement
(NSM) expected to be excluded from Dutch society (Belinfante, 1978).
Many of them were imprisoned in camps for political delinquents after
the war and many lost their jobs (Groen, 1984). De Jong (1995) mentions
the suicides of two prominent members of the NSM in June and December
of 1945. How many more political delinquents committed suicide is not
known (Groen, 1984). We predict that in the year the Netherlands was
liberated (1945), there was a high suicide rate among political delinquents
(Hypothesis 2). However, because political delinquents could have
expected to be excluded from society shortly before and after the libera-
tion of the Netherlands, we have investigated these political suicides over
the period 1944–7.
Breaking down the figures for suicides among political delinquents by
month provides a more detailed look at the application of the social
van Tubergen and Ultee Political Integration, War and Suicide
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integration theory. The Netherlands was not liberated all at once. The
southern part was liberated first, in September 1944, creating tremendous
enthusiasm among the general Dutch population, who all expected to be
freed from German occupation soon. Conversely, it contributed to
increased fear among NSM members, who expected a ‘day of reckoning’,
when they would face punishment for collaborating with the occupying
forces (Belinfante, 1978). Many NSM members left their homes; trains
were full of NSM members fleeing to the northern part to the Netherlands
and to Germany. At the end of 1944, about 65,000 political delinquents
had escaped to Germany (de Jong, 1995). However, it was not until April
1945 that the eastern part of the Netherlands was liberated and May 1945
before the German forces completely surrendered. We would therefore
expect to find two peaks in the number of suicides: one in September
1944, when the southern part of the Netherlands was liberated, and
another in April and May 1945, when Germany surrendered to the Allied
Forces (Hypothesis 3).
We also examine the setting in which political delinquents committed
suicide. Did suicide take place before, during or after they were taken into
custody? The social integration theory predicts that people are more likely
to commit suicide when they fear exclusion from society. In the case we
study, imprisonment not only meant exclusion from society for political
delinquents, but it was also a social stigma. Therefore, NSM members
were socially excluded both at the time they were imprisoned in barracks
for political delinquents and after they were released. The social integra-
tion theory predicts that political delinquents would have feared this and
that many would have committed suicide even before they were impris-
oned (Hypothesis 4).
We further investigate the impact of war on the ‘non-excluded’ popu-
lation in the Netherlands. After controlling for the suicide rates of Jews
and political delinquents, was the suicide rate in the Netherlands lower
during the time of the country’s involvement in the war? The social inte-
gration theory predicts that it was. Anti-German sentiments were strong,
resembling the great national enthusiasm Durkheim spoke of. Some
Dutch citizens openly and violently resisted the German forces. Most of
the Dutch followed the progress of the war and celebrated German defeats
in other countries. The German suppression of the Dutch created a
national enemy and strengthened social bonds. We thus hypothesize that
the suicide rate of the non-excluded population in the Netherlands during
the war years (1940–5) was lower than either before (1937–9) or after
(1946–8) the war (Hypothesis 5).
International Sociology Vol. 21 No. 2
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Data
The data on suicides for the Netherlands during this period are in the
form of individual records on standardized counting cards, preserved at
the Central Bureau of Statistics Netherlands (CBS, 1999). Individual-level
data on suicide are unique and avoid the problems associated with aggre-
gate-level studies on suicide (e.g. Lester and Yang, 1991; Marshall, 1981;
Wasserman, 1989), in which macro–micro relationships are studied with
macro-level data (e.g. war, unemployment rate, suicide rate). Many
researchers have therefore pleaded for individual-level studies on suicide
(Breault, 1994; Burr et al., 1994; Ellison et al., 1997; van Poppel and Day,
1996; van Tubergen et al., 2005). A potential limitation of individual-level
data on suicide resides not so much in these data, but in the unavailabil-
ity of appropriate data for the population at risk. Whereas our data for
suicides could be broken down after Jewish/non-Jewish and yes/no
political delinquents, as well as individual controls such as age and sex,
no such breakdowns are available for the population at risk.
We classified suicides among political delinquents in three ways: first,
by relying on official descriptions in the records about motives. If, during
the period 1944–7, we found such descriptions as ‘fear of arrest’, ‘politi-
cal reasons’, ‘member of the NSM’ or something similar, we interpreted
this as a political suicide. Second, the occupation of the deceased some-
times indicated a political suicide. Designations such as ‘militiaman’ or
‘SS soldier’ unequivocally refer to occupations of political delinquents.
Third, we looked at the place of suicide. Officials often recorded the
suicide as having been committed in ‘barracks’, ‘internment camp’, ‘a
school for political delinquents’ or similar venues. The data we used for
Jewish suicides during the period 1937–43 had been published earlier
(Speijer, 1948).
To estimate suicide rates (the total number of suicides per 100,000
persons), we collected information on the size of the general population.
Annual figures for the entire Dutch population in the period 1937–48 were
obtained from CBS (2003). Exact yearly statistics on the number of Jews
in the period 1937–43 are unknown, but most authors estimate the total
Jewish population in 1940 to have been about 140,000 in the Netherlands
(see de Wolf, 1946). Between 1940 and 1945, about 100,000 of the 140,000
Dutch Jews were killed by the Germans (de Jong, 1995). Because of large-
scale deportations to concentration camps in 1942 and 1943, the suicide
rates we present for these years are underestimated.
Precise information on the number of political delinquents is not well
documented either. The maximum number of Dutch inhabitants who
were members of the NSM is estimated at 150,000 (de Jong, 1995; de Jonge,
1968). This figure includes about 4000 SS soldiers, as well as a sizeable
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group for whom the label of political delinquent is less clear. The average
membership of the NSM was actually considerably lower than 150,000 and
fluctuated heavily over time. For example, the total number of NSM
members increased from 50,000 on 31 December 1940, to 78,000 on 31
December 1941, and decreased to 69,000 on 30 June 1942 (de Jong, 1995).
Hence, the number of political delinquents at risk in the period 1944–7
was probably considerably lower than 150,000; the suicide rates we present
here for political delinquents are correspondingly underestimated.
Results
Table 1 shows the findings on suicide for the entire Dutch population for
each year during the period 1937–48, with separate suicide figures for
Jews, political delinquents and all others. It is important to emphasize
that because our information pertains to the entire Dutch population, tests
of significance are redundant (van Tubergen et al., 2005). The table shows
that in 1940, the number of suicides in the entire population peaked at
1074 and, in 1945, peaked again, reaching 1009. According to Hypothesis
1, the 1940 peak should represent Jews who feared exclusion by the
German occupation. Table 1 shows that the suicide rate among Jews in
the Netherlands did indeed increase considerably, from around 20 in the
period 1937–9 to 167 in 1940. In the year the Germans took over the
Netherlands, 234 Jews killed themselves, about eight times as many as in
the preceding period, with a suicide rate (167.1/9.7) 17 times higher than
International Sociology Vol. 21 No. 2
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Table 1 Absolute and Relative Suicide Figures among the Total Population, Jews,
Political Delinquents and All Others in the Netherlands, 1937–48
Political
Year Total population Jews delinquents All others
1937 745 (8.7) 33 (23.6) – – 712 (8.5)
1938 833 (9.6) 25 (17.8) – – 808 (9.5)
1939 742 (8.5) 28 (20.0) – – 714 (8.3)
1940 1074 (12.2) 234 (167.1) – – 840 (9.7)
1941 645 (7.2) 38 (27.1) – – 607 (6.9)
1942 875 (9.7) 249 (177.9) – – 626 (7.1)
1943 826 (9.1) 165 (117.9) – – 661 (7.4)
1944 666 (7.3) – – 11 (7.3) 655 (7.3)
1945 1009 (10.9) – – 88 (58.7) 921 (10.2)
1946 849 (9.1) – – 7 (4.7) 842 (9.2)
1947 701 (7.3) – – 7 (4.7) 694 (7.4)
1948 698 (7.2) – – 0 (0) 698 (7.2)
Source: CBS (1999).
Note: Suicide rates per 100,000 are shown in parentheses.
 distribution.
© 2006 International Sociological Association. All rights reserved. Not for commercial use or unauthorized
 at University of Groningen on February 28, 2008 http://iss.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
the part of the Dutch population that did not fear racially motivated
exclusion. As can be observed from the table, 1942 and 1943 also showed
high suicide rates among Jews. In these years, social exclusion of the Jews
in the Netherlands became complete, as large-scale deportations to
concentration camps began (Ultee et al., 2001).
Hypothesis 2 predicts that in 1945, when the Netherlands was liber-
ated, suicide rates among political delinquents would increase. Table 1
shows that in this period (1944–7), there were 113 politically motivated
suicides. Of these, 81 were determined to have been politically motivated
using the motives mentioned by officials in the death records; the remain-
ing 32 were determined using occupation and place of suicide. We found
that in 1945, the suicide rate among political delinquents was 58.7, almost
six times higher than that among the non-excluded Dutch population,
which was 10.2. This confirms Hypothesis 2. Note that the relative suicide
rate among Jews in 1940 was 17, about three times higher than the suicide
rate of political delinquents in 1945, which was 6. Apparently, the Jews
feared the German forces more than the NSM members feared Dutch retri-
bution.
A more specific test of the social integration theory involves examin-
ing monthly suicide data. In Table 2 we present suicides by month for
1944 and 1945. Hypothesis 3 predicts that in September 1944 (with the
liberation of the south of the Netherlands) and in April and May 1945
(when the rest of the Netherlands followed), suicides among political
van Tubergen and Ultee Political Integration, War and Suicide
231
Table 2 Total Number of Suicides among the General Population and among Political
Delinquents by Month in 1944 and 1945 in the Netherlands
1944 1945
Total Political Total Political
Month population delinquents population delinquents
January 48 0 72 0
February 52 0 69 1
March 65 0 74 1
April 62 0 113 17
May 73 0 110 19
June 49 2 89 18
July 49 0 77 8
August 61 1 89 6
September 55 5 84 5
October 42 1 85 3
November 49 0 74 9
December 53 2 63 1
Source: CBS (1999).
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delinquents would show an increase. Table 2 shows that the number of
suicides for the total population in September 1944 did not exceed that
of other months that year; however, suicides among political delinquents
clearly increased. Out of 11 political suicides in 1944, five took place in
September. Furthermore, three individuals committed suicide in June and
August 1944, even before the Netherlands was partially liberated. With
respect to 1945, we see an overall increase in the number of suicides in
April and May. In April, when the eastern part of the Netherlands was
liberated, 17 political delinquents committed suicide. One month later,
when the rest of the country was liberated and the Dutch government
returned from exile, another 19 political suicides occurred. In June, we
count a further 18, confirming Hypothesis 3.
Another test of the social integration theory relates to the setting in
which the suicide occurred: before, during or after the individual was
taken into custody. Hypothesis 4 predicts that political delinquents would
commit suicide even before they were imprisoned. We were able to trace
the location of 78 of the 113 politically motivated suicides. For 18 persons
(23 percent of the 78), the fear of arrest was enough to cause them to
commit suicide. Officials described the motives for their suicides as ‘fear
of arrest’, ‘fear of punishment’ and so on. Of the remaining 60 suicides,
59 took place in prison. A further examination revealed that 19 suicides
were committed in detention rooms and 40 in internment camps. In one
case, an NSM member committed suicide after release from custody. The
marginal note on the record card, however, reports that the person was
no longer accepted in his community. All in all, these findings confirm
Hypothesis 4.
A final test of the social integration theory is to consider suicide rates
among the non-excluded population. Hypothesis 5 states that the suicide
rate of the non-excluded population was lower during the war than either
before or after. Re-examining Table 1 (the last column) shows that the
mean suicide rate among the non-excluded population in the prewar
period 1937–9 was 8.8. In line with the hypothesis, the suicide rate
dropped in the war years 1940–5, to 8.1. It is important to emphasize that
this decrease in the suicide rate could not be ascribed to improved
economic conditions. On the contrary, the Dutch population suffered
economic strain during the war, leading to 25,000 people dying from star-
vation (Kruijt, 1960).
Although comparing wartime suicide rates with prewar figures
confirms a decrease in the number of suicides during wartime, the lower
suicide rate after the war does not. In the postwar period 1946–8, the
suicide rate was 7.9, compared to 8.1 during the war. Why was the suicide
rate among the non-excluded Dutch population lower after the war than
it was during the war?
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The question can be phrased more precisely, because the contradiction
arises from the 1940 and 1945 peaks. The mean suicide rate during the
intermediate war period (1941–4) was 7.2, which was considerably lower
than the mean suicide rates of 8.8 before the war and 7.9 after. This
confirms Hypothesis 5. But why, then, was the suicide rate among the
non-excluded population so high in 1940 and 1945? We suspect that both
peaks represent undercounting of those who feared exclusion. The record
cards contain both fixed and open categories for officials to fill in, but
there was, of course, no fixed category in which suicides could be classi-
fied as ‘social exclusion’ or ‘political’. In addition, historians have docu-
mented that not only Jews, but also other groups expected to be excluded
from social life at the beginning of the occupation. De Jong (1995) lists
three famous non-Jewish intellectuals who committed suicide in May
1940, but less prominent people would have gone unnoticed by historians.
Due to the limitations of the data, we were unable to determine the
number of non-Jews who feared the German occupation.
What about the 1945 peak? We suspect that the 113 political suicides
we found represent only a fraction of the total number of politically
related suicides. We relied on two fixed categories (occupation and place
of suicide) and one open category (the motive for committing suicide)
entered by officials on the records. We feel confident that if an official
reported that someone belonged to the NSM, the person in question was
indeed a political delinquent. We have doubts, however, about whether
officials always recorded a person’s political affiliation in the records.
While the limitations of the data do not allow us to say more about this,
we do not feel that additional information would contradict the social
integration theory, since only more suicides that were motivated by social
exclusion would be found, further verifying our theory.
Conclusion and Discussion
Durkheim’s hypothesized wartime drop in suicides has posed three
empirical puzzles. It failed to explain (1) the decline in the suicide rate in
European countries that remained neutral during the First and Second
World Wars, (2) the peaks in the suicide rate at the beginning and end of
several European countries that were occupied in the Second World War
and (3) the absence of a wartime drop in suicide in the US, after taking
economic activity into account.
In this article, we argue that Durkheim’s political integration theory
could explain these empirical problems if it takes into account people’s
expectations for the future and if it considers the social integration of groups.
Puzzles (1) and (3) are solved by assuming that people in Europe more
strongly expected to become involved in actual fighting than the citizens
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in the US, for whom the actual fighting was thousands of miles away.
Puzzle (2) is explained by arguing that some groups might be excluded
from social life during wartime, instead of assuming – as Durkheim did
– that wars and other political events always increase the integration in
a country. Incorporating the refinements of Durkheim’s political integra-
tion theory, we proposed a more general ‘social integration theory’, stating
that the more strongly people expect to be excluded from society, the
greater their risk of committing suicide.
We tested our social integration theory by focusing on the Dutch
paradox, a specific case of puzzle (2). Why did the suicide rates in the
occupied Netherlands peak at the beginning and ending of the Second
World War? We assume that Jews feared social exclusion as the Germans
took over and that many political delinquents expected punishment from
the Dutch as the war ended. To examine these ideas, we analysed stan-
dardized records of individual suicides preserved at the Central Bureau
of Statistics Netherlands. In accordance with the social integration theory,
we found that the suicide rate among Jews was extremely high in 1940.
We also found empirical confirmation for the prediction that suicides
among political delinquents peaked at the end of the war. During the
liberation of the south of the Netherlands, in September 1944, the number
of political suicides increased and reached its highest point in May 1945,
when the rest of the Netherlands was liberated. We also found empirical
support for the idea that NSM members committed suicide even before
they were taken into custody. All in all, our analysis suggests that
Durkheim’s political integration theory should take people’s expectations
of the future into account and consider patterns of social integration more
generally.
Subsequent research could test the social integration theory with
detailed individual-level data on the suicide rates in Belgium and France
at the beginning and end of the Second World War. Like the Netherlands,
suicide rates in these countries peaked at the beginning and ending of the
war, and these peaks are presumably due to the social exclusion of Jews
and political delinquents, respectively. Another way to test the social inte-
gration theory would be to look at the suicide rates of people who are
unemployed or fear to lose their jobs (Stack, 2000), and to examine suicide
patterns among asylum seekers. Finally, the social integration theory
could be tested by examining suicides among people who were
renounced, or feared being renounced, by close-knit communities. Phillips
(1974) mentioned the suicide of Daniel Burros, a leader of the Ku Klux
Klan, who committed suicide after it was revealed that he was Jewish.
These and other examples are listed in the media and the scientific litera-
ture, and a more systematic treatment of these suicides would be a direct
test of the theory proposed in this article.
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